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Integrating the Subject: Narratives of Emancipation in Regionalism 
Floris de Witte  
 
The purpose of this paper is to understand how different regional organisations structure their 
understanding of the subject (the individual). It does so in two steps. The first part of the paper 
fleshes out why emancipation might be an interesting lens through which to look at projects of 
regional integration. Emancipation, at the highest level of abstraction, is concerned with the 
challenging the potential of (public) power to dominate the subject in the ways in which she 
understands or realises herself. The starting premise for this paper is that all integration projects 
have a selective vision of how the subject understands or realises herself, and that this selective 
vision needs to be appreciated in order to understand the organisation and process of integration.  
This, in turn, suggests that analysing how regional integration processes understand the subject 
requires us to look at three elements. First, we need to look at the ‘long history’ of regional 
integration: which narratives, cultural claims, or political circumstances have driven the process of 
integration? Which ideas of power and oppression have structured the need for trans-border 
cooperation? Second, we need to look at the specific objectives of the integration processes, and 
particularly at how it understands its economic, social, and political objectives. What type of subject 
emerges, and what modes of realisation are envisaged? Third, we need to look at the precise legal 
provisions and juridical framework that structure the interaction between subject and state: to what 
extent are individuals and their lives the object and subject of integration? This approach suggests 
that different geographical spaces will likely have different visions of their subject, and how she 
relates to the nation state. This regional specificity, of course, relates not just to wider cultural, 
historical or economic processes, but also serves to stabilise the specific instances of regional 
cooperation (part 1).  
The second part of this paper looks at the European Union, the African Union, and MERCOSUR 
through this lens, and traces different visions of emancipation and of the relationship between the 
subject, state, and regional integration. In the EU context, the citizen – primarily through the right to 
free movement – has in some sense emancipated from the state. The underlying logic, here, is that 
state power and state authority are understood to be problematic in so far as it prescribes a very 
particular kind of subject. Crucially, in the EU context, emancipation does not mean emancipation 
into another polity or identity. The legal structure through which emancipation is secured suggests 
that the EU is not trying to create a transnational identity as much as trying to liberate the individual 
from state coercion in their capacity to become who they want to become (part 2.A).  
In the context of the African Union, on the other hand, emancipation is culturally understood as 
emancipation from colonial rule – and into autonomous political communities. To the extent that 
regional integration has occurred (both in a pan-African and regional sense), it has focused most 
critically on the need to build state and institutional capacity. In a sense, there is a feeling that the 
African subject emerges with the state. The most extensive state obligations and political tools in the 
AU, for example, see to the prevention of military conflict within states, rather than across states. 
The capacity of the subject for self-expression and self-realisation is contingent on the stability of the 
institutional framework that allows for its articulation. What results is a vision that understands the 
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subject and the state as coterminous: the one cannot exist in a meaningful sense without the other. 
Unlike within the context of the EU, however, regional cooperation in the AU takes place against the 
backdrop of a strong sense of pan-Africanism, which ensures that state-building remains committed 
towards the subject rather than towards the creation of homogenous (ethnic) communities (part 
2.B.) 
In the South-American context, finally, we can best understand integration as the conflict between 
visions of, on the one hand, strong attachment to social and cultural regionalism and, on the other 
hand, (militant) economic nationalism. While regional integration in South-America focuses on 
economic cooperation, it is very weakly institutionalised – giving plenty of space for the articulation 
of state power. The exceptions to this are the rights to free movement of South-American nationals 
under MERCOSUR, which are both more extensive and more strongly protected than its economic 
counterparts. This suggests a vision of the individual as fractured and composite: at once a national 
and regional subject. Being able to articulate one’s self between these two visions, then, is 
understood as part of the subject’s human dignity – as something that states cannot limit (part 2.C).  
Overall, this paper aims to highlight that the relationship between subject and polity is helpful in 
understanding regional integration. States cooperate for a number of reasons. But the cultural, 
historical and social context within which they do, and the specific problems that they focus on, tells 
us something not just about the normative forces that drive the process, but also about the ethos of 
emancipation that drives and stabilises that process. The point of this paper, then, is less to exactly 
specify the precise nature of the European, African or South-American subject, and more to highlight 
that these subjects’ understanding of regionalism play a crucial role in institutionalising it.  
 
1. Emancipation and Regionalism 
Emancipation, in the broadest sense, is about the problematisation of structures of power that 
curtail the individual’s agency.1 These structures can exist in a political, economic, cultural or social 
form. Emancipation is about the progressive liberation of the subjects’ agency from these forms of 
domination.2 It is not a static concept: there is no checklist of ‘emancipatory objectives’ that must be 
met for a fully emancipated state of being. Instead, it is a dynamic and reflexive concept: the 
struggle for emancipation emerges and evolves with the subject’s articulation of agency.3 To put this 
more straightforwardly, the struggle for emancipation pops up whenever and wherever the subjects 
experience something as oppressing them. Historically, the process of emancipation is associated 
with the tearing down of quite specific and concrete exclusionary economic processes (e.g. the 
labour movement), political processes (e.g. the women’s voting movement) or cultural processes 
(e.g. the LGBT+ movement). More generally, however, we can see emancipation to be a reflexive 
(and reflective) process towards the articulation of the subject’s ‘self’. How we understand 
ourselves, after all, is both the cause and effect of the struggle of emancipation: the capacity to 
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articulate or realise our most authentic ‘self’ is a dynamic process that blurs the boundaries between 
‘being’ and ‘becoming’.4  
The capacity to realise one’s self, then, includes both an internal-looking and a developmental 
component, and it includes both a public and a private element – all of which cannot be separated 
neatly. On the one hand, emancipation sees to liberating the individual from understandings of the 
‘self’ that are imposed by external forces (be they political, social, economic, or cultural). In other 
words, this requires a negative space of freedom (not a space of negative freedom!) in which the 
individual can retreat and experiment who she is and what matters to her, unencumbered by 
external forces. This is, crucially, not a solitary experience. As Arendt put it, this process is dialogical 
– it requires continuous engagement with oneself as much as with the other.5 As Honneth highlights, 
moreover, this retreat into a negative space of freedom in order to understand and construct ‘the 
self’ is dynamic.6 It requires encounters with the ‘other’ and is inextricably linked with the public 
expression of the ‘self’. It is meaningless to talk of emancipation when the ‘self’ can only be 
expressed or articulated in one’s bedroom. ‘Being’ someone is a state that is both inward-looking (‘I 
know who I am’) but also presumes a public recognition of that state. Here the boundaries between 
‘being’ and ‘becoming’ start to blur. Emancipation is, after all, also about creating a space in which 
the ‘self’ can be expressed in public. A meaningful commitment to emancipation, it seems, 
presuppose structures that institutionalise respect and recognition for difference; that guard a 
negative space of freedom for the individual, and that provide basic resources for individuals to 
realise their ‘self’. Both ‘being’ and ‘becoming’, then, require an encounter with the ‘other’ – both 
privately and publically.7  
One of the biggest conceptual problems when thinking about emancipation is its ambivalent 
relationship with institutions. On the one hand, institutions have often been understood as 
generating or solidifying instances of oppression. The main historical examples of emancipation – 
against capital, against racism, against colonialism, against sexism – invariably challenge existing 
institutions and polities as perpetuating and legitimising oppression. On the other hand, however, it 
can be argued that a meaningful process of emancipation is difficult to sustain in absence of an 
institutional framework. Without solid democratic and juridical institutions, for example, it is difficult 
to guarantee the negative space of freedom through which individuals can express and assert 
themselves both privately and publically.8 These same institutions serve to protect the capacity to 
challenge oppression (for example, through voice), instantiate civic notions of respect and 
recognition, and, crucially, entrench the ‘victories’ of emancipatory struggle. Much of the legitimacy 
and authority of modern polities, in fact, seems to derive from their capacity to allow for, and 
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institutionalise new forms and types of emancipation.9 Institutions, then, can either allow for ever 
more emancipation or limit it. They can even do both at the same time – and in doing so suggest 
institutional (and cultural) sensitivities for particular kinds of oppression or domination while 
legitimising other kinds. Looking at institutional projects from the lens of emancipation, then, tells us 
something about a polity’s specific nature and essence.  
This specificity is even greater when we look at regional integration projects. These projects, in 
themselves, articulate certain limits to the nation state. Regional integrations typically serve (very 
different) instrumental or functional purposes. At a very general level of abstraction, however, they 
all serve to institutionalise emancipatory processes – either in helping the nation state to overcome 
certain forms of domination, or in disciplining the nation state so that it does not become the source 
of domination itself. This might be understood in the positive sense (e.g. solving climate change is an 
objective that a state cannot achieve alone) or in the negative sense (e.g. integration as an antidote 
to the nation state’s habit of excluding internally and being antagonistic externally).10 Either way, the 
nature of regional integration – as well as its institutional and legal framework – makes certain 
assumptions about what it is that the nation state cannot do. Regionalism, then, seems to be about 
making the state more sensitive, or transforming it, in a way that allows it to more easily meet 
whatever it is trying (not) to do.  
But, in doing so, regional integration also changes the subject. For one, regionalism suggests the 
existence of a community that is not exclusively statist – and opens the possibility for the self-
realisation and self-identification of subjects as ‘something’ else. Second, how the regional 
integration project frames the subject tells us something about the specific sites of domination or 
oppression that regional integration is used to problematize or overcome. In other words, 
understanding the ethos of emancipation that drives regionalism explains both the organisation and 
process of regionalism. If that sounds too opaque, it might be worthwhile thinking where exactly we 
can locate this ethos of emancipation in regional integration projects. Here we can distinguish three 
different elements, all of which play a role in understanding the place of the subject in regional 
integration. The first is the ‘long history’ of integration, that is, the historical, cultural, ethnic or social 
narratives that link a certain geographical space. These can be as diverse as allusions to previous 
cooperation (the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg used to be, once, one country), a shared 
history (the world war or colonialism), shared ethnic or communitarian visions (pan-Africanism), 
certain political ideologies (communist legacies), or linguistic connections.11 How these accounts of 
the subject are employed to legitimise regional cooperation matters as it tells us something about 
the backdrop against which the state transforms itself.12 The most obvious (and most studied) 
example of this is the EU, which is widely understood to be an answer to the Second World War. This 
‘long history approach’ matters as it tells us the kinds of oppression or domination that regional 
integration serves to rationalise or problematize; as well as the kinds of emancipation that it 
structurally favours or seeks.  
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The second element through which we can trace accounts of emancipation lies in the specific tasks 
and objectives that regional integration projects focus on. These range from economic cooperation 
to shared security cooperation to political union. Whatever the objectives, however, they need to be 
rationalised. Authority for their exercise at the level beyond the state needs to be sourced from 
somewhere.13 In other words, the object and nature of regional integration tells us something not 
only about the limits of the state, but also of the type of subject that can emerge from it. At the very 
basic level, for example, it seems to matter whether state consent remains necessary for enforcing 
any obligations arising from regional integration projects or whether a supranational enforcement 
mechanism exists; and whether the subjects derive certain rights that can be invoked against the 
state. These differing modes of integration, in a sense, tell us to what extent the state deliberately 
limits itself – that is, to what extent it understands itself (or its neighbours) to be prone to instances 
of domination or oppression, or to what extent it considers itself constrained by normative claims or 
processes that understand the nation state as a site of domination, or, conversely, whether it 
understands regional integration as an instrument for increasing the state’s autonomy.  
The third site where we can look in order to understand a regional integration’s commitment to 
emancipation is the most straightforward. This requires analysis of the range of individual rights that 
it offers the subject. In general terms, rights matter as they allow citizens to actively create rather 
than passively absorb a regional idea of ‘being’ or ‘becoming’.14 The specific kind of rights that the 
subject can avail herself of on the regional level, then, tells us which kinds of ‘being’ can be 
expressed or formed through regionalism. Typically, moreover, this is a kind that cannot be fully 
expressed on the national level, and, as such, it offers a glimpse into the types of domination or 
oppression that regionalism attempts to problematize.  
These three ways of looking at regionalism in order to tease out what vision of the subject lies at its 
core are crude and hardly exhaustive. They do not necessarily offer a precise way of defining 
regional integration projects (let alone compare them). The purpose of this paper, then, is more to 
offer a starting point for analysis of how regional integration relates to the subject, and for 
articulating the ambiguous relationship between regionalism and the nation state – wherein the 
subject’s self-understanding and self-realisation play an active role. In other words, while the way in 
which the subject understands herself and realises herself might be transformed by regional 
cooperation, it also lies at its source: without ‘something’ binding subjects across borders, regional 
cooperation would not exist. The below is an exploration of this ambiguity in three regional 
cooperation projects: the European Union, the African Union, and MERCOSUR.   
 
2. Creating the Subject: Comparing the EU, AU, and MERCOSUR  
From the outset it is clear that the differences in the nature, depth and type of integration between 
the European Union, African Union and MERCOSUR makes them to a large extent incommensurable. 
But emancipation offers one of the most coherent conceptual visions in order to compare widely 
different political projects. This is because emancipation is a dynamic concept: it suggests that there 
are always obstacles to the fully emancipated ‘self’ and always newly-formed or articulated sites of 
oppression – be it in the cultural, economic, or social sphere. Whether the fight for emancipation 
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deals with resisting market forces, gender discrimination or struggle for democracy does not matter. 
Emancipation is a never-ending and constant re-assessment of sites of domination that ought to be 
problematized and re-institutionalised.15 This makes it possible to compare the struggle for 
emancipation across different regional integration projects. This is not to say that the struggles are 
not markedly different, or can be easily classified, but to say that the processes through which they 
are articulated and mediated are comparable.  
In looking at the how the subject is understood in these three projects, we can trace different visions 
of emancipation and of the relationship between the subject, state, and regional integration. In the 
European Union context, the subject – primarily through the right to free movement – has in some 
sense emancipated from the state. The underlying logic, here, is that state power and state authority 
are understood to be problematic in so far as they prescribe a very particular kind of ‘being’. 
Crucially, in the EU context, emancipation does not mean emancipation into another polity or 
identity. Rather, it has a deeply aspirational nature: it is about allowing its subjects more 
opportunities to realise the ‘self’ by creating access to more choices as to how to live one’s life.  
Regional integration in Africa has a very different vision of the subject. The African subject, in a 
sense, emerges with the state: they are coterminous. This is tied to the backdrop of colonialism, in 
which the nation state is seen as an instantiation of emancipation, and can be traced in both the 
legal framework and political narratives that pervade African integration – both regionally and in the 
pan-African sense. Regional integration in Africa, then, focuses on institutional capacity-building 
within the state, or, in negative terms, on the prevention of instability within states. What underlies 
this process is an awareness that strong institutions are required to protect the individual in her 
private and public self.  
Within the South-American context, finally, integration is most significant when it comes to the 
mobility of its subjects. This can be explained by the curious mix between, on the one hand, 
(militant) nationalism with presidential models of political authority and, on the other hand, strong 
narratives of transnational community that articulate a historical, linguistic, religious, and ideological 
commonality that transcends the nation state. What results is a vision of the subject as being located 
between these two visions and realisations of ‘self’; and an idea of regionalism as being primarily 
focused on mediating between these two selves.  
 
A. European Union 
Integration in the EU is understood as a process that weakens the capacity of its states to dictate the 
terms and conditions under which its citizens ought to live. Emancipation, then, can best be 
understood as emancipation of the subject from the state. This can be traced in the EU’s history, its 
mode of integration, and the pivotal role – both conceptually and normatively – of legally 
enforceable individual rights in the integration process. Creating a subject whose life choices can no 
longer be dictated by state authorities, on this view, allows for an amplified expression and 
realisation of the self. This is not, however, a process wherein the subject as a national is 
emancipated ‘into’ a new transnational imagined community (hence the little traction that the 
notion of European identity has); nor is it a kind of emancipation that leads to a ‘retreat into 
freedom’, in which the subject exists in an institutional vacuum.16 Instead, the European subject is 
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re-institutionalised within the structures of her choosing, that is, the institutional structures that 
best allow for her specific self-realisation. This process of disembedding of the subject from state 
authority comes with significant emancipatory challenges of its own.  
The context within which European integration took place was heavily influenced by both political 
and economic concerns. In the broadest terms, European integration has always been understood as 
the answer to World War II, which could be seen as the culmination of the capacity of states to 
internally exclude citizens and externally antagonise their neighbours, which had been considered a 
problem even in the inter-war period.17 On this view, the objective to prevent war and reinstate a 
commitment to the equality of citizens could only be met through a significant curtailing of state 
power and popular sovereignty. This idea of ‘militant democracy’ explains both domestic and 
transnational constraints to the capacity of the state to limit the freedom of its subjects – ranging 
from constitutional courts and the ECHR to market integration through the EU.18 This political 
narrative that focuses on the need to prevent authoritarianism from limiting the subject’s 
aspirations and freedom, also, conveniently, resonated with later entries to the EU’s project. Greece, 
Spain, Portugal, and the Central and Eastern European states all suffered from authoritarian regimes 
in the decades before ‘returning to Europe’. If the ‘long history’ of European integration tells us one 
thing, then, it is a deeply rooted distrust of state power.  
This political vision of integration as a bulwark against authoritarianism is mirrored quite nicely the 
more economic or functional objectives of integration. The idea here is well known: by working 
together and expanding the market, the Member States could expand the size of the economic pie. 
This idea of comparative advantage has been institutionalised through the free movement 
provisions and the creation of a single market, and was premised on ordo-liberal economic beliefs. 
This puts the subject at the centre of the European project: while the objective is the need to 
constrain public (state) power, the main instrument to do so is the subject’s economic freedom.  
The centrality of the subject in the integration project has been bolstered by two juridical 
developments. The first is the process of integration through law.19 This speaks to the doctrines of 
direct effect and supremacy, through which the European Court of Justice has simultaneously 
imbued EU law norms with the capacity to strike down domestic norms that conflict with it, and 
allowed EU law to be effective even in absence of political will.20 The second is the role of the free 
movement provisions, which offer the right to cross borders to labour, capital, services, companies, 
and, later on, citizens. These have been read as individual constitutional rights, and are enforceable 
against the EU’s Member States, cannot be circumvented by political action on the national level, 
and are upheld against the state apparatus by national courts.21 These two developments mean that 
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20 Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ 100 Yale Law Journal (1991) at 2403. 
21 M. Poiares Maduro, We, the Court (Hart, 1998); Azoulai, ‘The Court of Justice and the Social Market 
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the subject has become the instrument through which the objectives of integration are achieved.22 
Every subject of EU law has the ability to challenge the exercise of state power where the latter is 
understood to constrain the former’s ability (or even willingness) to move across borders. This not 
only problematizes state authority but – evidently – also offers a very particular understanding of 
the European subject.  
What does this short historical and judicial account suggest about the idea of emancipation in 
European integration, and the relationship between state and polity? It suggests a number of things. 
Emancipation, in the European context, can primarily be understood as the emancipation of the 
individual from state control. The free movement provisions (and the corollary right of non-
discrimination based on nationality) serve to amplify available realisations of self for subjects to 
include those available in other Member States. It, essentially, tells the European subject that she 
can choose to live at home (and under the economic, social, political, cultural conditions that come 
with it), but she can also choose to live in structures that have more or less emphasis on these 
particular elements.23 This, is a sense, orients the individual’s capacity for self-realisation and 
therefore self-understanding outwards. It allows for expressions of ‘self’ that might be unavailable or 
unattractive in a subject’s own state. Koikkalainen’s research suggests that this effect takes place 
even in the absence of actual movement.24 The mere possibility of movement means that the minds 
of citizens go beyond the national borders, and beyond the understandings of ‘self’ that are 
permitted ‘at home’. In limiting the capacity of the state to control their citizen’s physical 
movement, then, EU law reflects significant emancipatory values. What it suggests, in a sense, is that 
oppression or domination in the European context primarily comes from the state’s capacity to 
control its citizens’ movement, choices, realisations and – implicitly – understandings of self. To put 
it as starkly as possible: an individual might identify herself most strongly by her sexual orientation, 
political values, lifestyle choices, or taste in music. But the nation state suggests that this does not 
matter. What matters is nationality – as this is the form of social integration that defines the group 
of people that you talk to (politically), that you agree choices with, share resources with, and who 
can define what constitutes permissive social or cultural behaviour, and what not. EU law, at a very 
general level, suggest that this is problematic. To use Amartya Sen’s words: 
‘A person belongs to many different groups (related to gender, class, language group, 
profession, nationality, community, race, religion and so on), and to see them merely as a 
member of just one particular group would be a major denial of each person to decide 
how exactly to see himself or herself. The increasing tendency towards seeing people in 
terms of one dominant ‘identity’.. is not only an imposition of an external and arbitrary 
priority, but also the denial of an important liberty of a person who can decide on their 
respective loyalties to different groups’.25 
                                                          
22 As Weiler highlights, this obviously comes with problems of its own: Weiler, ‘Van Gend en Loos: The 
Individual as Subject and Object and the Dilemma of European Legitimacy’ 12 ICON (2014) at 94. 
23 F. De Witte, ‘EU Citizenship, Free Movement and Emancipation’ in: F. De Witte, J. Shaw and R.Baubock (eds.) 
‘Free Movement under attack: Is it worth defending as the core of EU Citizenship?’ (RSCAS Working Paper 
2016/69). 
24 Koikkalainen & Kyle, ‘Imagining Mobility: The Prospective Cognition Question in Migration Research’ 41 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (2015) at 759.  
25 A. Sen, The Idea of Justice (2nd 2012), at 246-7. 
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The kind of oppression or domination that European integration problematizes, then, is the 
oppression in the name of ethnos – the oppression that comes from the way in which society is 
organised and its norms legitimated. Crucially, the process of emancipation in the EU does not see to 
the emancipation of the individual into a wider, pre-existing or imagined European community. In 
fact, some scholars have argued that the very reason that the EU should not be democratic or 
structure a strong peripheral identity is because a democratic EU would replicate on the 
supranational space the exclusionary processes that the EU was meant to prevent on the national 
level.26 The limited traction that the notion of European identity has (had) can partially be explained 
by the fact that the European subject is not institutionalised particularly strongly on the 
supranational level. The strongest articulation of ‘self’ of the European subject – through the 
exercise of free movement – does not (necessarily) presume self-understanding or self-realisation 
qua European. Instead, the exercise of free movement seems to say more about the subject’s 
specific aspirations than her European identity. The legitimacy that underpins the supranational 
character of the EU, in other words, is not premised on a strong sense of pan-Europeanness, but 
rather on catering for the individual’s aspirations.  
If the EU’s emancipatory process is about institutionalising the individual’s freedom to pursue her 
aspirations, it is not, as Honneth puts it, a ‘retreat into freedom’.27 For Honneth, disembedding the 
individual from her institutional framework through which the ‘self’ is given shape is not particularly 
emancipatory. Without such a framework, after all, the individual might be free in a formal sense, 
but remains unable to articulate or become the ‘self’ in a meaningful way. Neuvonen, for example, 
argues that the EU citizenship law understands the self as an unencumbered and private self, which 
makes self-realisation and emancipation difficult, given that these are premised on the idea of 
encountering ‘the other’.28 EU free movement law, however, does not only serve to liberate the 
subject from the constraints imposed by her home state. It does not seek to create an institutional 
vacuum into which the individual can retreat. Instead, EU law serves to reinstitutionalise the subject 
in her host state. The non-discrimination obligations attached to the free movement provisions, 
after all, allow the subject to make use of the institutional framework that allows for a negative 
space of freedom (such as welfare rights), and that protects the articulation of self (such as 
fundamental rights or economic activity). Crucially, then, free movement is not only about creating 
more opportunities for the subject to pursue her aspirations, but it also offers a way in which to 
reinstitutionalise the subject, so that the ‘self’ can be realised in a meaningful fashion. This process 
of reinstitutionalisation is contested. While it can be conceptualised as expressing the precise ties 
that link citizens across borders – be it in economic, social or cultural terms29 – it is also clearly at the 
root of the contestation of the idea of free movement, most powerfully in the Brexit process. And in 
fact, the past decades have seen the strengthening of the conditions under which European subjects 
are allowed to realise themselves across borders. These see to very specific dimensions of self 
(falling under the economic categories of ‘worker’, ‘self-employed’ or ‘service provider’) and to 
conditions of sufficient resources, so that the host state’s welfare structures are not impacted by the 
migrant’s way of realising herself.30 This process evidently imposes a significant limit on the 
                                                          
26 Balibar, supra note 10. 
27 Honneth, supra note 6, at 88. 
28 P. Neuvonen, Equal Citizenship and its limits in EU law (1st 2016).  
29 This is conceptualized as requiring the intra-EU migrant to show a ‘degree of integration’ in the host state 
society. See F. De Witte, Justice in the EU: The Emergence of Transnational Solidarity (1st 2015). 
30 See for the conditions of free movement in the EU, Directive 2004/38 (OJ L 158/77, 30.4.2004).  
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emancipatory potential of EU law, and articulates a vision of the subject that is functional. Subjects 
that are economically vulnerable, unable to work, or pursue realisations of self that require 
institutional support are not, in principle, part of the EU’s understanding of the subject.  
What we see when we look at the EU from the lens of emancipation, then, is a vision of 
emancipation that understands the subject as being oppressed by the state and its internal method 
of functioning. This can be explained by looking at the long history of integration, and the distrust of 
popular sovereignty after the Second World War. Emancipation in the EU, then, is aspirational: it 
sees to allowing the individual to live a life that more closely realises their idea of ‘self’. It is, in other 
words, more about becoming someone than it is about being someone. This is institutionalised 
through the rights to free movement and the legal peculiarities of the EU’s integration project, which 
allow individuals significant and legally enforceable right to physically move between the territories 
of the Member State. This at once disciplines the darker side of state authority while allowing the 
individuals’ bodies and minds to be emancipated from the nation state. While the EU seems very 
successful at questioning state power, however, it struggles to be sensitive to the way in which 
institutions remain crucial in offering spaces for meaningful expression of self-realisation. In this lies 
the ambiguity of emancipation in the EU.  
 
B. African Union 
In the context of the African Union, emancipation is historically understood as emancipation from 
colonial rule – and into autonomous political communities. Post-colonial regional cooperation in the 
African Union seems to operate on two different narratives. On the one hand, we can perceive a 
strong sense of pan-Africanism in both rhetoric and substance, which understand the subject as 
trapped by the inherited borders and its institutional structures. On the other hand, regional 
integration is – compared to other integration projects – very minimal and substantively 
unambitious, leaving states to operate relatively independently, with one clear exception. The most 
far-reaching legal and political obligations on states relate to the need to prevent military conflict 
and institutional instability within states. This suggests a vision of the subject that is institutionally 
entrenched: the African subject emerges with the state. In other words, this presumes that 
emancipation is conditional: it requires strong institutional resources and internal stability, without 
which the subject cannot emerge. These two narratives might appear at odds with each other. It is 
argued, however, that the two can best be understood as complementary. While the resources 
required to create a ‘negative space of freedom’ through which emancipation can be meaningful 
and the self can be realised publically do not exist beyond the boundaries of the state; the normative 
backdrop of pan-Africanism serves to direct institutional capacity towards the emancipation of the 
subject rather than towards state-building along ethnic lines. 
Regional integration in Africa is premised on a range of 17 regional economic blocks, the 8 most 
significant of which (CEN-SAD, ECCAS, EMU, IGAD, ECOWAS, EAC, COMESA, SADC)31 are linked 
together into an overarching institutional structure (the African Union) that primarily focuses on 
pan-African political and security cooperation. This paper focuses on this overarching structure, 
rather than the regional blocks – which differ widely in scope, nature, and level of 
institutionalisation.32 The backdrop against which to understand African integration and the framing 
                                                          
31 See annex to the issue for list of member states of each. 
32 See, for a discussion of the extensive free movement rights within ECOWAS, for example, the contribution 
by Neuvonen in this issue.  
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of the African subject is clearly that of colonialism, and the arbitrary civic structures that have 
resulted from it. In 1945 already, Pan-African Congress argued that ‘the artificial division and 
territorial boundaries created by the imperialist powers are deliberate steps to obscure the political 
unity of the African people.’33 The colonially-imposed territorial boundaries and institutional 
structures, often structured arbitrarily without regard to existing ethnic, tribal, cultural, or economic 
communities, were perceived to articulate an inauthentic vision of the subject.34 The years after 
colonialism were typified by a strong and widely-held commitment to pan-Africanism – albeit with 
significant disagreement about how to get there.35 In the immediate aftermath of decolonisation, 
two different approaches to regional cooperation emerged. As Thonke and Spliid tell it: “on the one 
hand Kwame Nkrumah introduced the philosophy that Africa should unite into a single political 
federation through an ‘all-African government’ (..) On the other hand, Julius Nyerere argued that 
Africa first had to unite at the regional level before the vision of one united Africa could be 
realised.”36 The latter view initially prevailed, and the principle of uti possedetis, which effectively 
froze the colonially-imposed borders was considered, somewhat counterintuitively, as the most 
obvious starting point from which to achieve pan-African unity.37 This decision is crucial in analysing 
how the African subject is understood in regional integration. It introduces a certain ambivalence 
that can best be explained as a product of the relationship between identity and regionalism. While 
the nature, scope and content of regional integration articulates a vision of the subject (so that a 
new, post-national subject is formed), the opposite is also true: the nature and strength of pan-
regional identity informs what regionalism can be about or ought to be about. In the African context, 
it is suggested that the relative strength of pan-Africanism constraints what states can be about, and 
informs what regional integration ought to be about.  
This ambivalence explains why regionalism in Africa is both premised on highly symbolic rhetoric 
relating to pan-African ambitions and on the strengthening of the independence and institutional 
capacity of the nation state. Pan-Africanism provides the legitimacy for integration and cooperation, 
as well as for its central values, and is often wheeled out in discourse justifying and explaining 
African Union decisions. The 2063 Agenda, an Action Plan approved by 54 African Heads of State 
(only Morocco is not a member of the AU), for example, explicitly highlights the need to ‘emphasize 
the importance to success of rekindling the passion for Pan-Africanism, a sense of unity, self-
reliance, integration and solidarity that was a highlight of the triumphs of the 20th century.’38 Pan-
Africanism is also explicitly at the core of the recent project to create a Single African Transport 
Policy, with liberalized aviation industries and road corridors linking the different states, and the 
project to offer an African passport, with visa-free travel between states (both approved in the 
summer 2016 and 2017 summits of the African Union in Kigali and Addis Ababa).39 More generally, it 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
33 S. Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa (1st 1972). 
34 P. Esedebe, Pan-Africanism: The Idea and Movement: 1776-1991 (1st 1994). 
35 Thonke & Spliid, ‘What to expect from regional integration in Africa?’ 21 African Security Review 2012) at 47.  
36 Thonke & Spliid, supra note 35, at 48.  
37 Michael, ‘Panafricanism, African Boundaries and Regional Integration’ 8 Canadian Social Science (2012) at 
232.  
38 https://au.int/en/agenda2063 (last visited 20th June 2018) 
39 https://www.ssatp.org/ and http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/05/africa/african-union-passport/ (last visited 
20th June 2018) 
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also explains the already-existing commitments to free movement across regional blocks40 - 
migration having always played a central role in the African experience, even in the absence of 
coordination and institutionalisation.41 National borders, in other words, are seen as historically 
contingent and the ability to move across borders as central to what it means to be African. They are 
understood as arbitrary hangovers from colonialism, as placeholders that defy other, more authentic 
and legitimate, senses of identity, being and ‘the self’.  
At the same time, almost all cooperation is explicitly premised on the autonomy of Member States, 
and substantively focuses on ways to enhance their institutional capacity. To put it bluntly, 
cooperation is primarily geared towards strengthening states, not weakening them in the name of 
pan-African unity. In general terms, economic cooperation has been relatively unsuccessful in Africa 
(with a few exceptions). The main explanation highlights the lack of homogeneity in governance and 
democratic structures between regional partners, and the lack of basic infrastructural and 
institutional resources.42 Even if the African Union ambitiously aims to integrate the different 
regional economic cooperation blocks to coordinate between them, and to create a continent-wide 
customs union and common market by 2023, most commentators agree that meaningful economic 
cooperation and integration will require significantly more institutional capacity than is currently 
available in most states.  
The most important characteristic of African integration over the last decades, however, is an 
increased focus and commitment to prevent conflict and large-scale violence within states. Thonke 
and Spliid argue that the turning point for this was the failed UN mission in Somalia in 1991.43 Ever 
since, as the reluctance of the global community to intervene in African disputes increased, Africa 
has become more assertive in its own security management. This has led to the rethinking of the 
(until then) sacred principle that underpinned African integration: the principle of non-interference 
and state sovereignty. With the exception of the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998-2000, 
all violence in Africa in the last 20 years has started as intra-state (and often ethnic) conflict. The 
limited institutional capacity of states, after all, is not only reflected in its unstable economic 
infrastructure. States are also considered too weak institutionally is also unable to contain and 
institutionalise conflict. In consequence, the most extensive and ambitious projects of regional 
cooperation see to military or peacekeeping intervention. 
The African Union’s Peace and Security Council has far-ranging (and binding) powers to support the 
AU’s general objectives, which include ‘the right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a 
decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity’,44 and the ‘condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of 
                                                          
40 Lavanex et al, ‘Regional Migration Governance’ in: T. Borzel and T. Risse (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Regionalism (1st 2016). 
41 Hartmann, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’, in : T. Borzel and T. Risse (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Regionalism (1st 2016). 
42 Thonke & Spliid, supra note 35, at 42.  
43 Thonke & Spliid, supra note 35, at 47.  
44 Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. See http://www.achpr.org/instruments/au-constitutive-act/ (last visited 
20th June 2018)  
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government’.45 The Peace and Security Council has the ability to impose sanctions, authorise action 
in case of potential, actual, or recently finished violent conflict, and can authorise peace missions. So 
far, it has been active in aid of peaceful transition and the prevention of unconstitutional changes in 
Mali, Mauritania, Togo; and in military intervention in Sudan (Darfur), Somalia and the Comoros. 
Practically, these interventions take place through the regional blocks, and the AU primarily acts as 
an intermediary between these regional actors and the UN. The ECOWAS intervention in Ivory Coast 
in 2010, on the mandate of upholding democratic processes, is a perfect example of this. Despite 
clear institutional constraints and practical problems, it is clear that – at least conceptually – regional 
integration in Africa prioritises the need to stabilise states from conflict internal to them. It sees the 
stability and autonomy of institutional structures as crucial in achieving the objectives of 
integration.46 
What to make of this mix of strong pan-Africanist aspirations, a strong commitment to state 
autonomy, weak institutional structures on the national level, and the growing sense of the 
legitimacy of intra-state intervention to protect citizens from conflict and unconstitutional changes? 
What does it tell us about how the subject is framed, and the kinds of emancipation that are 
supported by regional integration? At a high level of abstraction, it is clear that if integration and 
emancipation in the European Union is about weakening strong states; in the context of African 
integration we can best understand the process as one that is about strengthening weak states. The 
limited institutional capacity of most African states is understood as the core problem – and one that 
prevents any meaningful sense of emancipation of its subjects. This is perhaps reflected best of all in 
the preamble to the constitute act of the African Union: ‘conscious of the fact that the scourge of 
conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the 
continent and of the need to promote peace, security, and stability as a prerequisite for the 
implementation of our development and integration agenda’. In African integration, then, 
emancipation appears to require the creation of strong states, capable of producing and defending 
the ‘negative space for freedom’, positive and negative rights without which the self cannot possibly 
be articulated or realised in a meaningful sense.   
Emancipation requires strong domestic institutions for a number of reasons. First, weak institutions 
constrain pre-existing understandings of ‘self’ and alter the available ways of expressing the ‘self’. 
They are unable to secure the democratic and judicial framework that protects the private space 
through which individuals can understand themselves and the public space through which they can 
realise themselves. Second, weak institutions allow for (violent) domination and competition among 
communities, each vying for control over the state’s institutions and resources. As mentioned 
before, only one of the African conflicts over the last 20 years started as an inter-state conflict. 
Typically, conflict starts as intra-state, and more often than not, these conflict can be traced back to 
tension between ethnic groups over control of resources or institutions. Stronger institutional 
capacity is required to allow for the institutional mediation of such conflicts. Third, weak institutions 
cannot produce the positive rights that are indispensible in liberating the subject from the mere 
pursuit of survival. Structures providing schooling, healthcare, shelter or food provide the subject 
with the basic instruments through she can manage life’s vicissitudes, and are preconditions for any 
kind of self-realisation. But the stable provision of these resources requires (at the very least) the 
                                                          
45 Article 4 (o) of the Constitutive Act. See http://www.achpr.org/instruments/au-constitutive-act/  (last visited 
20th June 2018) 
46 Hartmann, supra note 40; Vandegiste, ‘The African Union, Constitutionalism and Power Sharing’ 57 Journal 
of African Law (2013) at 1.  
 14 
administrative capacity to lock in subjects, extract resources, and manage vast redistributive 
projects. Weak institutions, then, are understood to create oppression and domination that stand in 
the way of any meaningful form of emancipation. 
This explains that regional integration in Africa has focused on strengthening the state, protecting 
democratic transition, and only limits state autonomy in order to prevent large-scale violence. In 
other words, the road towards emancipation of the African subject starts with preventing violent 
conflict within states; continues with the construction of strong institutional capacity within states 
that allows for the peaceful problematisation of economic, ethnic, social or political domination, and 
the institutionalisation of new forms of emancipation; and ends with a pan-African space in which 
the subjects can realise their authentic self.   
If we compare this to the EU model, we might be less optimistic of the capacity of states to play a 
positive role in the quest for ever more emancipation. At the same time, it appears that the pan-
African discourse that underpins the creation and strengthening of state autonomy in Africa allows 
for a much stronger mode of systemic integration between citizens across borders and might 
prevent the formation of strong and antagonistic ethnic communities that coincide with the 
boundaries of polities. If anything, then, the arbitrariness of boundaries in Africa might be a blessing 
in disguise: it allows for the push towards strong states without the risk of creating strong national 
identities that narrow the scope for the exploration of ‘self’. 
 
C: MERCOSUR 
In the context of South-America we can trace yet another understanding of the subject and the 
presuppositions for her emancipation. Like in the EU, cooperation in South-America is premised on 
the existence of strong and autonomous states. Unlike in the EU, however, this is not seen as a 
problem to be solved. And like in the African context, the normative backdrop for regional 
integration in South-America is the existence of a relatively thick transboundary community of 
identification. A movement towards unification of the South-American continent,47 on this view, 
underpins not only regional integration in South-America but also informs the subject’s role in it. 
What this mix leads to is, on the one hand, a very weakly institutionalised economic cooperation 
project, and, on the other hand, a very ambitious and liberal free movement policy – allowing all 
South-American nationals almost unfettered access to the whole continent. This suggests something 
about the nature of the subject – at once national and regional – and that the ability to articulate 
one’s self between these two visions is understood to be central to the subject’s self-understanding.  
Regional integration in South-America takes place against the backdrop of two conflicting long-term 
cultural, social and political processes.48 On the one hand we find a tradition towards unification, 
primarily inspired by Simon Bolivar, which has never gone out of (intellectual) fashion and provides a 
deep cultural narrative of belonging, sharing and ‘sameness’ that transcends the geographical 
boundaries between the states. This narrative highlights the similar ethnic, linguistic, cultural and 
historic make-up of the citizenry and institutional structures between the South-American states, 
and it highlights their joint struggle for liberation from the European oppressors. Regional 
cooperation in South-America, then, is partially understood as a coming together of a wider, ill-
                                                          
47 To prevent confusion, I will not use the term ‘Pan-Americanism’, because it is often used to include North-
America. Neither will I use ‘Bolivarism’ as a shorthand for the feeling of togetherness that spans the South-
American continent for that term comes with a very specific (socialist) vision of that togetherness.   
48 Fawcett and Hurrell, supra note 13. 
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defined but relatively homogenous transnational community. This homogeneity is more starkly 
visible when one considers how relatively similar citizens in Bogota and Montevideo are compared 
to citizens living equally far apart in the rest of the world (consider how similar citizens are between, 
say, Zurich and Yaounde, or between Berlin and Kabul).49 Consequently, while decolonialisation 
ultimately did not lead to the creation of a continent-wide polity, its subjects have always been 
understood as ‘more than nationals’. As Acosta highlights, in fact, this regional subject already 
emerged as a legal category in the early 19th century.50 
On the other hand we find a history of almost militant (economic) nationalism in state formation, 
starting in the late 1800s. Oszlak highlights a number of similarities in the process of state formation, 
wherein the new states all faced significant internal struggles for institutional domination and 
legitimacy, primarily caused by the limited territorial integration within states.51 In consequence, the 
institutional structures that emerged throughout South America are more typified by their robust 
capacity to settle conflict and extract resources than any specific political orientation or values.52 
Throughout the region, for example, state institutions are constructed around a very specific civic-
military relationship and social and economic classes that correspond to different roles in the 
production and distribution of (agricultural) resources.53 This served to legitimise state-building in 
the absence of strong communitarian or historical and ethic visions of community. The need to 
create strong centre-periphery relations also explains why most political systems in South-America 
invest significant amounts of power in their president and appear to resist limits to that power, even 
after the experiences of authoritarianism of the latter half of the 20th century. This emphasise on 
state power can also be traced in regional cooperation, which has remained squarely based on 
intergovernmental structures (whether within the context of MERCOSUR, UNASUR, ALBA, CELEC or 
PA).54 There is little transfer of state authority or enforcement capacity to the level beyond the state.  
This contradiction between, on the one hand, the protection of national (economic) autonomy and, 
on the other hand, strong transnational communities can also be traced in the substance and 
method of regional integration. The history of integration in South-America, to be fair, was always 
concerned with both economic and more political objectives. Recent developments, since the early 
2000s, however, indicate a strong turn away from trade and economics towards what is called a 
‘post-neoliberal conception’ of regional integration.55 What this suggests is that cooperation is not 
fundamentally premised on the economic theory of comparative advantages – which necessitates or 
justifies, as the European example suggests, relatively significant limits to state authority, the sharing 
                                                          
49 The distance between these sets of cities is 4800km. 
50 Acosta, ‘Free Movement in South America: The Emergence of an Alternative Model?’  (Migration Policy 
Paper), available at: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/free-movement-south-america-emergence-
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51 Oszlak, ‘The Historical Formation of the State in South-America: Some Theoretical and Methodological 
Guidelines for its Study’ 16 Latin American Research Review (1981), at 3. 
52 Oszlak, supra note 51, at 7. 
53 F. Lopez-Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America 1810-1900 (1st 2000). 
54 See xxx for list of member states of each. 
55 Riggorozzi, ‘The Social Turn and contentious politics in Latin America post-neoliberal regionalism’ in: A. 
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of sovereignty, and strong enforcement mechanisms. Instead, regional integration is increasingly 
premised on developing a shared social dimension, regional infrastructure, development agenda’s, 
fostering economic autonomy and cooperation in areas such as healthcare,56 that is to say, 
objectives that can be pursued with the retention of state power.  
In fact, looking at South-American integration from the widest perspective indicates that integration 
serves to protect state power (and its capacity to attain certain objectives) rather than to rationalise 
state power.57 Riggirozzi explains this development by referring both to domestic electoral cycles, 
which, since the early 2000s, saw a range of leftist presidents that sought alternatives to trade as the 
basis for regional cooperation and to the emergence of ideas of solidarity as a placeholder for 
legitimation narratives regarding regional cooperation.58 This explanation, again, nicely mirrors the 
central feature of South-American integration – which marries an accumulation of political power in 
national actors with the enduring account of cross-border solidarity or cooperation inspired by 
accounts of pan-Americanism.  
The relative absence of meaningful trade agreement or economic integration can be juxtaposed with 
a very liberal and ambitious free movement regime and (prospective) transnational citizenship. The 
MERCOSUR Residence Agreement and the UNASUR project of a ‘South-American citizenship’ are the 
most ambitious of these projects.59 The 2002 Residence Agreement – which entered into force in 
2009 – grants MERCOSUR citizens (as well as Bolivian and Chilean nationals, and, by extension, 
Colombian, Ecuadorian, Peruvian, Surinam and Guyana nationals) the right to work and live on the 
territory of all the states. Provided that the migrant has no criminal record, he or she is given a two-
year residence and work permit, which is transformed into a permanent permit after these two 
years. Article 9 of the Residence Agreement offers migrants the same economic, social, cultural and 
civil rights as nationals.60 In 2010, a Statute of Regional Citizenship was adopted in MERCOSUR 
Council 64/10, highlighting that ‘the statute of MERCOSUR citizenship shall be composed of a group 
of fundamental rights and benefits for all nationals of the states parties of MERCOSUR, and shall be 
based on the following objectives, among others (…) implementation of a policy of free circulation of 
people in the region; equal civil, social, cultural and economic rights for nationals of all MERCOSUR 
states; equal conditions of accessing work, health and education.’61 This Citizenship is meant to enter 
into force in 2021, even if its implementation and enforcement remains contingent on national 
implementation (and consent) as well as a range of harmonisation measures regarding social 
security. At the same time UNASUR, which in its founding treaty highlights the need to ‘strengthen 
South American identity through the progressive recognition of the rights of Member State nationals 
residing in any other Member State, with the goal of achieving South American citizenship’,62 has 
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60 Article 9 of Mercosur Residence Agreement. See Accord 13/02, on the Residence of Nationals of State 
Parties of MERCOSUR, and to Accord 14/02 on the residence of Nationals of MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile. 
61 MERCOSUR/CMC/DEC. N° 64/10, Decision approved December 16th. 
62 UNASUR founding treaty, available at: 
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launched a process towards the creation of a South-American passport and citizenship, with similar 
aims as the Mercosur Residence Agreement, but more explicitly highlighting the narrative of a 
coherent, transnational identity underpinning it. As the UNASUR Secretariat reports after the 2016 
summer meeting: ‘The building of the South American citizenship promotes free intra-regional 
mobility; and the creation of a South American education space and common identity, which will 
contribute to deepening the regional integration process. In addition it will guarantee civil, political, 
labour and social rights for all natives of the member-states who are at present residing in any 
country of South America.’63  
Whatever form its eventual implementation will take, and regardless of how successful the project 
of the creation of a South-American citizenship will be, the direction of travel is clear. It seems that 
in South-America, the subject is understood as structurally fragmented – at once a national and a 
regional citizen. These two identities are neither in conflict nor in competition with each other. Nor 
is the subject understood as an instrument for further integration or economic cooperation. The 
transnational community of identification is not something that is constructed through integration. 
Instead, it is something that limits the capacity of states not to pay attention to it: its existence, and 
the normative strength of the narrative of ‘sameness’ constrains states in their capacity to 
understand the citizen as exclusively national. To put it as simple as possible: in return for the 
autonomy and authority of the state that is guaranteed through economic intergovernmentalism; 
the state promises its citizens that they are able to understand and articulate themselves as regional, 
South-American, citizens. The key to understanding integration in South-America, arguably, is that 
emancipation is contingent on both the existence of strong states – that offer the welfare resources 
and institutionalise the civic rights that allow for self-realisation – and a space beyond the state 
through which the self can be expressed and realised. Emancipation, in other words, is understood 
as the emancipation of the individual into a wider cultural space and ‘imagined community’ that 
transcend the boundaries between states in South-America, with retention of the institutional and 
administrative structures that allow for the stable production of welfare and civic resources.  
While this starting point does not stand in the way of economic integration (but neither does it 
mandate it), it is clear that it lies at the core of the ambitious and liberal regime of free movement. 
More than that, it is clear both historically and in the text of the legal provisions on both national 
and regional level that this right to free movement is understood as a fundamental right, part of the 
subject’s core rights.64 Crossing borders is understood as an expression of ‘being’, not – as in the EU 
– a more aspirational idea of ‘becoming’. Crossing borders in South-America, revealingly, does not 
require any proof of sufficiency of resources, health insurance, or the ability or willingness to work. 
To put it as simple as possible, mobility in South-America is not about who you want to become, and 
the subject’s right to reside in another state is therefore not contingent on fulfilling certain 
functional criteria or adhering to a hegemonic idea of being. Instead, mobility is an expression of 
who you already are. Imposing limits on this kind of mobility, then, is a much more egregious 
violation of the subject’s ability to articulate her authentic self than in the European context. It does 
not only affect the subject’s available realisations of self, but affects their human dignity: their 
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capacity to be themselves.65 In consequence, the right to reside across the South-American states is 
disentangled from any particular realisation of the subject.   
If we compare this to the EU model, the main difference is the relative trust in state authority and 
state power – and the more liberal and ambitious understanding of the regional citizen. In the EU, 
state power is distrusted as it reflects ethnic or cultural visions of being that are exclusionary 
(internally) and often antagonistic (externally). In South-America, it seems, this is less of a worry. In 
fact, the strength of the unified identity as a cultural and social narrative (and the corresponding 
weakness of nationalist visions based on ethnic or cultural differences) might suffice to discipline the 
state’s capacity to exclude internally or antagonise its neighbours. In other words, understanding the 
subject as being both Uruguayan and South-American, and allowing for the expression of self as 
both, makes the state stronger: it allows them to legitimise the institutional and civic structures of 
the state. The state, through regional integration, has turned its greatest weakness into its strength: 
rather than being seen as illegitimate by only partially reflecting what the citizen is and can be, it 
allows the citizen to construe and realise the ‘self’ between the two poles of national and regional 
identity. Of course, therein also lies its weakness: the institutionalisation of economic nationalism 
has come with a system of political control that squarely centres around the national capitals 
without offering a meaningful institutional site for the articulation of the emancipatory struggle of 
the regional citizen.  
 
Conclusion: Emancipation, Regionalism and the Limits of the Nation State 
This account of the ways in which regionalism can be understood to reflect emancipatory values has 
told us a number of things. First, all regional integration projects understand the role of the state to 
be contingent. States, to put it as simple as possible, are good at some things, and bad at others. 
States are typically understood to be good at creating an institutional structure through which 
emancipatory struggles can be articulated and institutionalised. The rule of law, fundamental rights, 
institutional sites of mediation and legitimation, and welfare provision, as such, can be understood 
as ways in which state capacity helps the emancipatory project. But states can also, as we saw, 
create forms of domination that stand in the way of the subject’s self-realisation. In the European 
context, this comes from the state’s capacity to exclude groups that do not conform to hegemonic 
visions of ‘self’. In the African context, the state is understood as being too weak to help 
emancipation: it inhibits any meaningful sense of emancipation by a lack of institutional capacity. In 
the South-American context, states create domination because they artificially prioritise a political 
community (the nation state) over cultural, social or ethnic communities that transcend the borders 
of the nation state and are part of the subject’s ‘self’.  
Each of these projects of integration, then, has its own ethos of emancipation, based on 
presuppositions about, and vision of, the subject. What is similar, however, is that by understanding 
how the subject is framed we can better grasp the way in which regionalism is organised and 
institutionalised. In this, the most interesting connection is that between, on the one hand, the way 
in which the subject and her possibilities for self-realisation are transformed through regionalism 
and, on the other hand, the regional identity underlying the regional integration projects. This, once 
                                                          
65 This is – of course – an idea of human dignity that is particular to the South-American context. As Trotter 
points out, the European idea of ‘being’ is much more strongly embedded within a developmental idea that 
highlights the closer link between being and becoming. See Trotter, ‘Time in European Human Rights Law’ (on 
file with the author).  
 19 
again, goes to the blurred conceptual distinction between ‘being’ and ‘becoming’. It seems that the 
existence of strong (imagined) communities beyond the state serves as an instrument to constrain 
the exercise of state power. To use simple examples, a president of Senegal that renounces his 
‘Africanness’, or an Argentinian president who wants a free movement deal with Russia but not with 
Colombia, will struggle more than when (s)he makes the opposite claim. In the UK, on the other 
hand, renunciation of ‘Europeanness’, or giving priority to a trade deal with New Zealand over 
Portugal appears less problematic. The reference to ‘being’ across borders, or the invocation of an 
imagined community across borders, then, forces states to internalise a vision of the subject that is 
structurally open to elements beyond the state. The strength of these imagined communities 
beyond the state function as an instrument for the systemic integration of non-nationals within 
domestic institutional structures. They are also indispensible in reinstitutionalising emancipatory 
processes beyond the state. Habermas’ work within the context of the EU seeks to achieve this by 
appealing to the ‘double sovereign’ that is the subject: at once national and European – and 
understands this as a precondition for the possibility to reinstitutionalise conflicts and claims to 
justice and emancipation on the level beyond the state.66 
This does not mean that all is well in the world of emancipation and regionalism. All three areas 
studied understand the role of the state differently; offer a different understanding of the subject, 
and face different challenges. Within the EU context, we have seen the emergence of literature 
bemoaning the evaporation of power and authority, and with it the institutional context within 
which subjects can express and realise themselves in a meaningful sense. More than that, there is an 
increasing awareness that EU law only allows for certain types of self-realisation. This is also where 
Habermas’ concern comes from. He argues the need to find a way to reinstitutionalise claims to ‘self’ 
in order to prevent creating a society in which retreat into freedom or economic activity is the only 
possibility.67 Within the context of the AU, a lot of work needs to be done to stabilise the 
construction of state capacity in a way that is pluralistic and offers a way to construct the rule of law, 
democracy and welfare entitlements that serve to institutionalise conflict and stabilise the 
emancipatory project. In the South-American context, the main problem is probably the precarious 
balance between regionalism and a commitment to intergovernmentalism and state sovereignty. 
The pursuit of a liberal free movement regime and South-American citizenship, its implementation 
and its longevity appear to be structurally premised on an understanding that the political leaders 
remain convinced by it. Putting state consent as the core of transnational processes, history tells us, 
creates an unstable structure, in particular in a region where mobility is understood as expression of 
self rather than realisation of self. More widely, these struggles throughout regionalism highlight 
that their stability is at least partially contingent on its vision of the subject (and its capacity to 
implement or institutionalise that vision).  
Above all, this contribution suggests that emancipation can be a very useful lens through which to 
understand state transformation and regionalism. Both regionalism and the process of emancipation 
are historically contingent. The EU, AU, and MERCOSUR are miles apart in their economic 
development, institutional sophistication, political commitment, and scope and objectives. Yet, all 
three offer an ethos of emancipation that are particular to their nature, and offer insights into how 
the transformation of the nation state relates to wider claims of ‘self’ and the subject.  
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